Mackerels in the Moonlight: Corrupt Politicians and Anti- Corruption Reform in Two-Candidate Elections by Haldun Evrenk
Mackerels in the Moonlight: Corrupt Politicians and








1I would like to thank my advisor Dilip Mookerjee for his help and encouragement. Gregory Besharov,
Martino DeStefano, Hsueh-Ling Hyunh, Bart Lipman, Michael Manove, Zvika Neeman, Rasim Ozcan, Onur
Tas, and Jorgen Weibull provided helpful comments. Errors are mine.Abstract
This paper examines causes of the persistence of corruption among elected politicians and the
e⁄ectiveness of some commonly discussed anti￿ corruption reforms. We study a theoretical model
of competition between two candidates who di⁄er both in ability and popularity in a probabilistic
voting setup. Each candidate proposes a tax rate and a public good level. The elected candidate￿ s
ability determines the cost of producing the public good. The budget constraint implies that taxes
collected must equal the sum of funds used in public good production plus funds stolen by the elected
politician. We solve for the tax rate and public good level chosen by each candidate and how much
each candidate decides to steal. We then identify conditions under which (i) imposing constitutional
constraints such as tax rate (upper) or public good (lower) limits, (ii) increasing compensation of
elected politicians, and (iii) small changes in legal penalties, will reduce corruption and increase
voters￿welfare. We ￿nd that the designers of a successful reform need to have information that is
privately held by candidates. The redistributive e⁄ects of a reform and how that would a⁄ect the
popularity of the reform is discussed as well. Finally, we argue that a welfare￿ improving reform
that would reduce the corruption may not be supported by both corrupt and honest politicians.1 Introduction
According to a survey conducted by the Open Society Institute, three-fourths of Lithuanians believe
that either most or all of the politicians in their country are corrupt (The New York Times,
November, 7, 2002). Corrupt politicians, as citizens of many other countries would agree, exist
beyond the borders of Lithuania as well. John Randolph complained1 that his Congressional
colleague, Henry Clay, ￿... is so brilliant, so capable, and yet so corrupt that like a rotten mackerel
in the moonlight, he both shines and stinks￿ . Depending on the strength of the law enforcement, a
politician as well as anyone else may decide to commit a corrupt act. The advantage of democracy
over other forms of government is that any politician who wants to be reelected incorporates
the e⁄ect of his actions on his support from the electorate in subsequent elections. Yet, given
voters￿dislike of corruption and politicians￿desire for reelection, it seems paradoxical that corrupt
politicians not only survive in politics, but also win repeatedly. In light of recent ￿ndings on the
negative impact of corruption on economic growth, the need to understand the role of political
institutions in deterring corruption is especially crucial. In this paper we examine conditions under
which politicians engage in corrupt behavior, analyze the e⁄ectiveness of some commonly discussed
anti-corruption reforms, and discuss willingness of politicians to support such reforms.
The argument for the persistence of corruption in democracy is based on the nature of political
competition. We formalize the idea that candidates can be di⁄erentiated from one another in
terms of dimensions other than corruption, e.g., with respect to their ability or popularity with
voters. A candidate that is more able or popular than his rival can engage in greater corruption and
still remain competitive. This is captured by a model of electoral competition with probabilistic
voting, in which voters evaluate candidates in terms of the policies they o⁄er, as well as their
intrinsic loyalties. Loyalties may be subject to random, unpredictable swings, implying that even
1Quoted in Ehrenhalt (2002).
1candidates identical in ability and ex ante popularity can a⁄ord to engage in corruption and yet be
reelected with positive probability. In the model, candidates propose ￿scal policy platforms, where
the amount they steal from the public treasury is implicitly de￿ned by the di⁄erence between
revenues and public good costs. Candidates thus choose the amount they steal along with the tax
rates they propose. Corruption in equilibrium is increasing in heterogeneity among candidates with
respect to their popularity and ability, and in the extent of randomness in voter loyalties.
An analogy to the context of price competition between two ￿rms helps explain this point.
Consider two ￿rms that select price and quality of their respective products, in a context where
there is uncertainty about their relative demands. Bertrand competition will then allow ￿rms to
price above cost and select suboptimal qualities.
Political corruption with electoral competition in a probabilistic voting setup was considered
earlier by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Polo (1998) and Persson and Tabellini (2000). Our model
extends and generalizes their work in a variety of directions, and more importantly allows us to
consider, (and compare the e⁄ectiveness of), di⁄erent anti-corruption reform proposals within the
same framework. In comparison with Brennan and Buchanan, for instance, we assume that theft
is not the only source of rents for elected o¢ cials. Power (ego-rents) may be valued for its own
sake. Besides, salaries and perquisites of o¢ ce represent a source of legal rents that represent a
policy parameter. This di⁄erence in assumptions about the motivation of politicians has important
implications for the e⁄ects of di⁄erent kinds of policies on corruption and welfare.
Consider the e⁄ects of constitutional constraints on tax rates that Brennan and Buchanan (1980)
promote as instruments for reducing corruption. Their argument is based on the assumption of a
(Leviathan) government, which faces no competition and for whom theft constitutes the sole source
of rents. We investigate the e⁄ects of tax constraints in a setting with duopolistic competition and
multiple sources of rents. We ￿nd that tax constraints are e⁄ective in the case where competing
2candidates are ex ante identical, but may be counterproductive when they are not.
The analogy with market competition is again helpful in explaining this. Although they consider
an example of elected politicians in the beginning of their book, for all parts the Brennan-Buchanan
theory is analogous to a monopolist, who does not face any political competition, who selects a
quality (pubic good level) and charges the highest price (tax) that leaves the buyer indi⁄erent
between buying the good and not. In such case, the only incentive to produce any quality is that
quality increases willingness to pay (taxable income level). The tax rate constraints in that setup is
the same as regulating the price charged by the monopolist, as studied in Spence (1975). When tax
rates and public good levels are determined by a candidate who has to win, maybe an imperfectly
competitive, election rather than a Leviathan, the nature of the problem changes. Now, we have
two sellers with possibly di⁄erent marginal costs (ability), who both decide on the quality and the
price of the good that they are selling without knowing their relative demands. What prevents
each seller from providing low quality is not a decrease in the overall willingness to pay (because
we assume that taxable income level is independent of public good level), but the possibility of
rival ￿rm producing a lower price-quality ratio and stealing the demand, electoral competition.
The question of whether imposing a price ceiling in such a duopoly results in higher consumer
welfare is, however, more complicated than the case of monopoly. In a duopoly, when ￿rms have
di⁄erent marginal costs, they end up with price and quality levels that are di⁄erent from each
other. Unlike Polo (1998) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) who assume quasi￿ linear preferences,
we study voters who have separable but not necessarily quasi￿ linear preferences. That generality
allows us to notice that a constitutional constraints enforcing a "lean" government is not the only
solution to political corruption. Another type of constitutional constraint, would be a binding lower
bound on the public good level, ￿ a minimum quality regulation using the market analogy, where
any leader has to provide at least a given level of public good when he wins the election. As in
3tax rate limits, we ￿nd that when candidates are identical and marginal utility of consumption
is decreasing, a constitution that enforces candidates to propose a public good level that is larger
than they would propose otherwise. In order to calculate the appropriate constraints in both cases,
however, drafters of a constitution will require information that is privately held by the (current
and future) candidates, such as how able, popular, and honest they are. If such information is
held by the drafters of the constitution, then by employing both type of constraints corruption
may be eliminated at no cost. When drafters do not have such information, than constitution is
just another level where voters with con￿ icting interests try to tilt the outcome towards their most
preferred policy platform, since the poor prefer a constitution that enforce a minimum public good
level, and the rich prefer tax rate limits, even when these constraints decrease aggregate welfare.
Hence, a quali￿ed majority agreeing on some type of constitution is di¢ cult to gather. We also ￿nd
that when the candidates are not identical, either of the constraints may have the opposite e⁄ect
of raising corruption and lowering welfare.
A commonly proposed reform to reduce the illegal appropriation of public funds is to increase
the legal compensations of politicians, e.g., as suggested by Becker and Stigler (1974). In the
market analogy, this corresponds to a prize (￿nanced by consumers) given to the ￿rm with the
highest sales. In that case, a ￿rm has incentives to increase its sales, which can be accomplished
by proposing a better price-quality ratio, i.e., lowering the level of corruption. Increasing the wage
is, however, costly, since customers eventually ￿nance the wage bill. We ￿nd that when candidates
are identical and there are no legal incentives for corruption the bene￿t of wage increase (lower
corruption) justi￿es the cost. But in the presence of legal penalties, this is not always so. The
distributional impact of wage increases is also di⁄erent from those of tax rate limits, i.e., most
of the burden of the former is borne primarily by the rich, the latter by the poor. For the wage
reform that would implement a second￿ best optimum we need private information about the cost
4of stealing for a candidate.
When legal incentives are very strong (a high probability of getting caught and resultant harsh
penalties), a candidate will remain honest no matter what the electoral incentives. When the legal
incentives are weak, the political competition game may have multiple (two) equilibria: either both
candidates stay honest or at least one steals. In terms of anti-corruption e⁄ects, one has to be
careful. Since the legal incentives reduce the expected rents from the o¢ ce, a small increase in
legal penalties can raise corruption and lower welfare.
Finally, we consider the incentives of candidates to propose an anti-corruption reform. When
both candidates are corrupt, it is not surprising that they would have no interest in proposing a
reform that would eliminate some of their rents. We argue that even an honest candidate may not
want to support such a reform if his opponent is corrupt, since it removes an important source of
his competitive advantage.
In summary, modelling it as an agency problem, our model contributes to an understanding of
persistence of corruption in democracies in a variety of ways. Political corruption may stem from
factors that are beyond the control of constitution designers, such as voter loyalty and candidate
heterogeneity. There is no such thing as the best anti-corruption reform. Many reforms commonly
suggested may increase corruption under certain conditions. It is especially di¢ cult to design an
e⁄ective reform when one candidate is honest. Even when a reform could improve voter welfare,
implementation requires information that reformers may not have. Di⁄erent reforms have di⁄erent
distributional e⁄ects and hence the voters may not unanimously support a welfare improving reform.
And even when there exists a welfare improving reform that is supported by electorate, it may not
be proposed by any of the politicians, corrupt or honest, competing for public o¢ ce.
Section 2 presents the model without law enforcement. In section 3, we prove existence and
uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium. In section 3 we also present comparative statics, an example using
5quasi￿ linear utility function, and a discussion and generalization of results from the literature.
In section 4, we discuss constitutional constraints on tax rates. In section 5, we introduce law
enforcement, and then discuss the e⁄ect of higher wages and higher legal penalties. In Section
6, we present other approaches to model the agency problem in politics. We discuss that the
approach we follow is better in evaluating di⁄erent reforms, since it models strategic interaction
between candidates. In Section 7, we discuss the extensions of the model and conclude. Most of
the proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Let us imagine a society where each voter i has income Yi; out of which he pays an income tax
at ￿ at rate ￿ and consumes the rest. The income in society is distributed over [Ymin;Ymax] with




normalized to one. There are two political agents (candidates) who compete for votes. Candidate
j 2 f1;2g chooses a policy platform, i.e., promises a tax rate, ￿j; and a per capita public good
level, Gj: He implements the promised policy platform when he wins the election.
Each voter i has preferences over his consumption of the private good, ci = (1 ￿ ￿)Yi; and the
public good, G: Preferences over consumption are represented by a separable utility function
U(ci;G) = I(ci) + H(G);
where I() and H() are two strictly increasing, C2; and concave functions from R+ to R with at
least one of them being strictly concave. Strict concavity ensures the single￿ peaked preferences over
tax rates. Unless we use quasi￿ linear form to simplify calculations2, to ensure interior outcomes we
2When we use quasi￿ linear form we can explicitly calculate the condition for interior solutions, see footnote 9 on
page 15.
6assume
Assumption (No Extreme Platforms): The marginal utility of consumption converges to
in￿nity as the good consumed goes to zero, i.e., limc#0 I0(c) = limG#0 H0(G) = 1:
The voters have preferences over the characteristics of political agents as well. The utility of





i;Gj) + (j ￿ 1)￿i2: (1)
where c
j
i denotes consumer i￿ s consumption when the policy platform of candidate j has been
implemented. Following the probabilistic voting literature, we assume that ￿i2 can be written as
b + b2 + bi2; where b is the electorate￿ s average bias in favor of candidate 2 which is known ex
ante. A positive (negative) b means candidate 2 is more (less) popular. From the candidates￿
point of view, the other terms in voter preferences, b2 and bi2; are random variables uniformly




2f]: The ￿rst term, b2; re￿ ects uncertainty about a
correlated preference shock, while the second term, bi2; re￿ ects an idiosyncratic shock on individual
i￿ s preferences. We assume that these preference shocks are statistically independent of each other
and of b, i.e., E[b2 j b;bi2] = 0 and E[bi2 j b;b2] = 0:
We assume sincere voting: Voter i votes for candidate j when U
j
i > Uk
i : If U
j
i = Uk
i ; then each
candidate gets the vote with equal chance. Both candidates run for the same position, which we call
the position of leader. The leader produces the public good from the available public funds using a
linear technology, that depends on his ability. The (non-veri￿able) ability levels of each candidate,
aj; can be di⁄erent. The higher is the ability of the leader, the lower is the cost of producing any
level of public good. The available public funds that can be used by the leader in the production of
public good is equal to collected tax revenues minus the salary of the leader, (denoted by w); and
an amount that he chooses to steal. Let Sj denote the public funds stolen. The per capita public
7good delivered when candidate j is the leader is
Gj = aj(￿j ￿ w ￿ Sj): (2)
We assume that a politician has to o⁄er a non-negative public good level. The set of feasible
policy platforms for a candidate is any tax rate from the interval [w;1] and any level of stealing
that provides at least a zero public good level. Then the strategy space of candidate j is ￿j =
f(￿j;Sj) : ￿j 2 [w;1] and Sj 2 [0;￿j ￿ w]g:
When a candidate wins the election, he is going to get legal rents and will have access illegal
rents. In addition to salary, legal rents include ego rents, E:3 Following the corruption literature,
we assume that there are deadweight losses from illegal rents: when the leader diverts a dollar from
the public budget, a fraction 1 ￿ Lj will be wasted, so the leader will appropriate only Lj < 1:
This assumption, known as ￿leakage￿or ￿deadweight loss of corruption￿in the literature, re￿ ects
the possibility that the leader should share the illegal rents with some of his political supporters
or with corrupt bureaucrats, or that there is a moral cost of stealing. When the leader is what
Rose-Ackerman (2001) calls ￿pathologically honest,￿we have Lj = 0:
We assume that candidates are expected rent maximizers. The rents that candidate j receives
conditional on being elected are
Rj(Sj) = w + E + LjSj: (3)
3We consider changes in the wage as a possible way to reduce the politician￿ s incentives to steal; hence, we want
to seperate rents into ego rents, rents that can not be (at least easily) designed and wages, rents that can be perfectly
controlled, at the cost of higher taxes.







i ;Gk)] + Pj]; (4)
where Pj = 2(j￿3
2)b is the e⁄ect of ex-ante popularity advantage of candidate j and the expectation
is taken with respect to ￿: Note that ￿j can also be written as a function of (￿j;Sj;￿k;Sk), i.e.,
￿j = 1
2 + g[E[U((1 ￿ ￿j)Yi;aj(￿j ￿ w ￿ Sj)) ￿ U((1 ￿ ￿k)Yi;aj(￿k ￿ w ￿ Sk)] + Pj]:
2.1 Agency Problem
Let us set the outside option for candidates at zero. Then candidate j selects a policy platform5






j); j = 1;2 denote a Nash equilibrium:
(￿￿
j;S￿
j) 2 argmax ￿j(￿j;Sj;￿￿
k;S￿
k)Rj(Sj): (6)
To evaluate an anti￿ corruption reform, we look at its e⁄ect on the equilibrium outcome, and
check whether voters are better o⁄ or not in the new equilibrium. Since there are a continuum of
voters with di⁄ering preferences on policy, we use an aggregate measure of voters￿welfare. The
voters￿expected (purely utilitarian) welfare, E[W]; as a function of policy platforms, popularity
and probability of winning the election of each candidate can be written as6
4See Appendix.
5From the candidate￿ s point of view (￿j;Gj) and (￿j;Sj) are interchangeable.
6See Appendix.




The policy platform, (￿0
j;S0
j); which maximizes E[W] when adopted by candidate j will be
referred as the ￿rst￿ best policy platform for candidate j. It is easy to check that the ￿rst best
policy platform for candidate j 2 f1;2g involves zero corruption and a tax rate which maximizes
E[Ui((1￿￿j)Yi;Gj(￿j))], the average utility of the electorate. The optimality of zero corruption is
intuitive: Given the tax rate, less stealing means higher public goods delivered. On the other hand
the optimal tax rate depends on our choice of aggregate welfare function.
2.2 Nash Equilibrium
Conditional on Sj;￿k;Sk; candidate j selects ￿j to maximize ￿j: This implies,7 given (5), that he
selects ￿j to maximize average voter utility conditional on Sj: So, in our model the agency problem
exists, if at all, in only one dimension, i.e., stealing. This is due to the assumptions that candidates
are rent-maximizing, that voters are well informed, and that there are no special interest lobbies.
This observation also simpli￿es the analysis, since the strategy space reduce to the level of stealing
alone.
To see when we have an agency problem, we need to consider the ￿rst order condition with







should be less than or equal to zero in equilibrium. It is equal to a weighted average of two marginal
gains: (i) the average marginal disutility of voters from corruption weighted by gRj, and (ii) the
7See Appendix.
10marginal utility from a stolen dollar conditional on being elected, weighted by the probability
of winning election, ￿j. If (8) is always negative, reducing Sj makes the candidate better o⁄.
Then candidate sets Sj = 0; and there is no agency problem. When (8) is positive at Sj = 0;
then candidate j keeps stealing until (8) becomes zero.8 Let s0
j(Sk) denote the best response of
candidate j to a rival stealing Sk: We show in the Appendix that the corruption levels of candidates
are strategic complements, i.e.,
@s0
j(Sk)
@Sk ￿ 0; and that the best response functions are continuous
and they intersect only once. We therefore obtain
Theorem 1 There exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the political competition
game.
Depending on the parameters the outcome is (i) overall corruption (both candidates steal), (ii)
partial corruption (only one candidate steals), or (iii) no corruption (both candidates o⁄er policies
that maximize voters￿welfare). Figure 1 describes four di⁄erent subsets of parameters that give
rise to these di⁄erent outcomes. The thick curve is s0
1 (S2): In graphs (a) and (c) both candidates
steal. Only Candidate 1 steals in (b). In (d) none of them steals. Note that to determine the
outcome of the game, we need to know (i) whether s0
j(0) > 0 or not, and (ii) if s0
j(0) = 0 for at
least one candidate, then whether Sj < s0
j(0) or not, where Sj = inffSj j s0
k(Sj) > 0g:
Which subset of parameters gives rise to which of the graphs in Figure 1?. We do not have
closed form solutions for those sets. Incorporated into our model I(:) and H(:) are also parts of the
parameter space, which makes the conditions particularly messy, (see the Appendix). To be able
to convey the intuition about which parameters increase/decrease incentives to be corrupt, one can
either (i) choose a ￿nice￿functional form for U; where these conditions become more tractable, or
(ii) look at the comparative statics. We do both.











Figure 1: Nash Equilibria
2.3 An Example: Quasi￿ linear Utility
Assume9 that U = c + 2￿
p
















where Aj = ￿2(aj ￿ ak) + Pj is the relative advantage that the candidate j has and K0
j is equal
to the illegal rents that are payo⁄ equivalent to legal rents, w+E
Lj : The unique Nash Equilibrium of
9Note that quasilinear form does not satisfy our assumption on in￿nite marginal utility at zero zorruption. Since
it simpli￿es calculations considerably and earlier studies, both Polo (1998) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) use
quasilienar form, we provide that example. On the other hand the policy platforms proposed by candidates in
equilibrium may involve 100% taxes when utility is quasilinear. To prevent that we need to assume that neither the









2 for j 2 f1;2g:








Lk) for all j 2 f1;2g if and only if we have either 1
4g+ Aj ￿K0
j > 0
for all j 2 f1;2g; or 1
4g+ Aj +K0














2 > 0; S￿
k = 0 if and only if 1
4g+ Aj + K0
j > 0 for only j 2 f1;2g and we





2 for k 6= j:
(iii) S￿
1 = S￿
2 = 0 i⁄ 1
4g+ Aj ￿ K0
j ￿ 0 for all j 2 f1;2g:
As both Polo(1998) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) note, the quasi￿ linear utility function
implies that the e⁄ects of higher corruption will be only higher tax rates, while public good levels
are always ￿rst-best. Also, the slope of the reaction function that we ￿nd above is independent of
the parameters of the model. Both of those results are driven by the quasi￿ linearity. In Appendix,
we show how the e⁄ect of corruption on tax rates and public good levels di⁄er for separable but not
necessarily quasi￿ linear utility functions. For such utility functions, the slope of reaction function
is not necessarily independent of parameters of the model either. However even when we consider
that larger set of utility functions, the direction of comparative statics does not change. In the next
section we present comparative statics again for general U.
2.4 Comparative Statics and Relation to Previous Literature
Let us calculate the e⁄ect of a small change in one of the parameters, g;b;E;a on the reaction
functions. Then, we show that the results of previous studies can be considered as applications of
those comparative statics in special environments.
Lemma 1 Consider Sk such that candidate j￿ s best response is to steal, (s0
j(Sk) > 0): Any of the
following would cause j to steal more, (shift s0
j(Sk) to the right):
- an increase in the uncertainty about popularity, 1
g;
13- an increase in the popularity of candidate, Pj;
- a decrease in the ability of the rival candidate, ak; and
- a decrease in ego rents, E:
Proof. When s0
j(Sk) > 0; we have (8)=0. Then applying the implicit function theorem, the above
results are obtained.
Let us now examine how the comparative statics in Lemma 1 relates to previous literature on
agency problem in politics. Brennan and Buchanan (1980), in their pioneering study of political
economy of taxation, consider the state, for most part, as a dictator who uses his powers to further
his own private interest and does not face any political competition. To justify that assumption,
they begin with an election example: two competing politicians o⁄er policies on how to distribute
$300 among three voters. When there is uncertainty on vote shares, they claim that ￿each party
would rationally appropriate some of the $300, even where the other party did not￿ (Brennan and
Buchanan (1980), p 22). After noting that when the aggregate vote shares are stochastic, ￿the
multi-party competition and more importantly the simultaneous announcement of policies is not
fully constraining as Downs claims,￿Brennan and Buchanan build their theory of ￿the foundations
of a ￿scal constitution.￿However, their conclusion that candidates necessarily steal, is an outcome
of speci￿c assumption that there are no legal rents.
Theorem 2 (Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Polo (1998)) Suppose that candidates are
identical, (a1 = a2; b = 0); are not pathologically honest, (L > 0); and there are no legal rents,
(w = E = 0). If there is overall uncertainty, (1
g > 0); then Sj > 0 in equilibrium:






14When there are no legal rents, the only source of rents is corruption. Hence there is no point
of winning the election if a candidate cannot acquire any illegal rents, i.e., the weight on voters￿
disutility on corruption is zero when Sj is zero. Then at Sj = 0; the marginal utility of corruption
for candidate j is L￿j; which is strictly positive when we have L > 0. Thus unless the candidate
is ￿pathologically honest￿ , we always have s0
j(0) > 0: Hence the unique equilibrium outcome is
corruption by both candidates.
As Theorems 3 and 4 reveal, uncertainty about the outcome of elections is neither necessary nor
su¢ cient for corruption to occur. Actually as we discuss after Theorem 4, uncertainty is necessary
for corruption not to occur when there are legal rents and candidates are not identical. The e⁄ect of
uncertainty on electoral incentives of a candidate can be seen from (8): The larger the uncertainty,
the smaller g; and the less important the policy issues for winning the elections, hence less weight
on voters￿welfare. Theorem 2 does not require a speci￿c utility function. Also, as far as there are
no legal rents, Theorem 2 would hold even if candidates were not identical.
Polo (1998) does not mention the work by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), but his model does
provide a well speci￿ed environment for the phenomenon ￿rst discussed by them. In Polo, the
process that leads to uncertainty in vote shares, probabilistic voting, is explicitly modelled. The
policy is two dimensional, preferences are quasi￿ linear, U(ci;G) = ci +H(G) where H(:) is strictly
concave. As Brennan and Buchanan, Polo also assumes expected rent maximizing candidates and
no legal rents. In Polo￿ s model, popularity di⁄erences among candidates are allowed. He ￿nds that
such di⁄erences are important for candidate￿ s incentives to steal.
Theorem 3 (Polo (1998)) Suppose that there is no ability di⁄erence between the candidates,
(a1 = a2); and no overall uncertainty about candidate preferences, (1
g = 0): If one candidate is
more popular than the other, (b 6= 0); then (only the) popular candidate will steal.
15Proof. When 1
g = 0; there is no uncertainty about the winner of an election. The candidate who
proposes a policy platform that provides higher utility to the median voter wins the election for
certain. Suppose that both candidates adopt the (identical) policy platform that is most preferred
by median voter. Then the more popular candidate, say k; will certainly win. But unless he is
￿pathologically honest￿ , he could a⁄ord to steal a little and increase Rk without risking his victory
in elections, i.e. without lowering ￿k. Since that would increase his expected rents, he will steal in
the equilibrium.10
When, in addition to popularity advantage there is uncertainty about voter loyalty swings, the
incentives to steal increase even further. The intuition for the e⁄ect of greater popularity is that it
permits that candidate to steal more without making himself inferior to another candidate. This
helps explain the paradox that pointed out by Kurer (2001) as well as by many others, i.e., some
corrupt politicians are also quite popular. Our model would explain this by reversing the causality
implicit in the expression. Politicians are not popular because they are corrupt, but rather that
popular politicians can a⁄ord to be corrupt. The logic of Theorem 3 will apply when the politicians
di⁄er not in terms of their popularity but in their ability. The one with the higher ability is able
to get some ￿Ricardian rents￿in the equilibrium even when there is no uncertainty.
Persson and Tabellini (2000) discuss the agency problem in politics employing a probabilistic
voting model and a quasi￿ linear utility function as Polo (1998) but they consider ego rents as well.
Theorem 4 (Persson and Tabellini (2000)) Suppose that U = c + H (G), candidates are
identical, (a1 = a2 and b = 0); there is no wage, but there are ego rents coming from the o¢ ce,
(E > 0). Then, there is political corruption i⁄ E < L
2g:
10Note that we need some discreteness in the strategy space, otherwise the optimum best response, and the
equilibrium do not exist.
16Proof. When both candidates are identical, the equilibrium (which is unique by Theorem 1) is
symmetric, so ￿j = 1













; then (8) is negative at Sj = 0; i.e., s0
j(0) < 0 for both candidates.
Then S￿
1 = S￿





The result that when ego rents are high enough, there exists an equilibrium without corruption
applies for any utility function. That result can be extended to heterogeneous candidates: When-
ever the ego rents are su¢ ciently high and there is uncertainty about voter loyalty, 1
g > 0, both
candidates choose not to steal, despite any advantage that one may have over the other.
We have shown which factors lead to political corruption. Now we will address what can be
done about it.
3 Constitutional Constraints as Anticorruption Reform
Brennan and Buchanan (1980) discuss how an individual member of society who decides behind
a ￿veil of ignorance￿would like to impose constraints on the political decision-making process or
on the domain of the political outcomes to maximize the expected utility of his future selves. As
a way to reduce political corruption, we consider ￿rst constitutional constraints on tax rates11 as
discussed in chapter 10 of Brennan and Buchanan (1980), and then another type of constitutional
constraints, lower bounds on public good levels, which, as far as we know, have not been discussed
before.
In previous section we ￿nd that aggregate uncertainty does not necessarily lead to political
corruption. Our point in this section is that even when it does lead to corruption in democra-
11An example is the Proposition 13, which was approved by voters in California in 1978. It restricts the tax on
real property to 1 percent of market value.
17cies, proposed remedies (constitutional constraints) should be discussed in a model of political
competition, not using a model of Leviathan. The following is an attempt in that direction.
Let us ￿rst assume that the parameters of the model are such that in equilibrium at least one
politician steals, so electoral incentives are not enough to deter political corruption. Now we can
study how the constitutional constraints interact with electoral incentives. Let us ￿rst consider the
constitutional constraints on tax rates.
Proposition 1 It is impossible to implement the ￿rst best policy platform, (￿0
j;G0
j) through impos-
ing a tax rate constraint on candidate j.
Proof. The ￿rst order condition with respect to taxes in a Nash equilibrium is
gRj
@E[Ui((1 ￿ ￿j)Yi;aj(￿j ￿ w ￿ Sj))]
@￿j
￿ ￿j = 0;
where ￿j is a Kuhn-Tucker multiplier satisfying ￿j(￿j ￿ ￿) = 0: Suppose there exists a ￿ that
implements the ￿rst best. Then ￿j > 0. But in a ￿rst-best the expected marginal utility of
electorate with respect to tax rate should equal zero. Contradiction.
The fact that tax rate constraints cannot implement the ￿rst best does not mean that they are
useless. It simply means that these constraints may provide a bene￿t, yet they have a cost as well.
Our second question is about the second￿ best: When does a tax rate constraint increase voters
welfare in a society with political corruption?
3.1 Constitutional constraints when candidates are identical.
Let us consider two (ex-ante) identical candidates competing with each other in a country where
the tax rate that a politician can propose is constrained to be less than or equal to ￿: Using (8),
we have the equilibrium level of corruption by each candidate, S(￿); given by




The e⁄ect of a tax rate limit on corruption level can be calculated as,
S0(￿) =
Ra2H00(G)
Ra2H00(G)] ￿ LaH0 (G)
for S > 0;
where R = L
2agH0(G); and G = a(￿￿w￿S(￿)): Note that whenever H(:) is a strictly concave function,
the derivative, S0(￿); is strictly positive, hence reducing the tax limit would reduce stealing. But
also note that, although positive, the derivative is less than one: The decrease in corruption comes
with a cost, a reduction in public good level. So, the net e⁄ect of tax rate constraints on voters￿
welfare is not clear and needs to be calculated. Using (7), the e⁄ect of an incremental change in ￿








￿ E[YiI0(Yi(1 ￿ ￿)]:
When H(:) is strictly concave
@E[W]
@￿ is always negative at unconstrained political equilibrium with
identical corrupt candidates, i.e., at (￿￿;G￿); we have aH0(G￿) = E[YiI0(Yi(1￿￿￿)]. Thus we have
the following result.
Proposition 2 Whenever marginal utility from public good is decreasing, (H(G) is strictly con-
cave) and both candidates are identical and corrupt, there always exists a constitutional constraint
that enforces both candidates to o⁄er a tax rate that is lower than ￿￿ and that constraint is both
corruption reducing and welfare-improving.
The intuition is that the tax rate constraints lower G, for a given level of corruption, raising
marginal utility of public good. This increases the voters￿disutility from corruption. Hence the
19marginal utility of stolen funds for a candidate becomes negative at S￿. A candidate reduces the
level he steals because now the cost of stealing in terms of votes foregone is higher. This is, as far
as we know, the ￿rst formal analysis of constitutional tax rate limits in an electoral setup. The
di⁄erence between Brennan and Buchanan￿ s analysis is not simply that we have two candidates
where they have one Leviathan. What derives their result is the assumption that higher public
good levels increase the taxable income, yet higher taxes reduce taxable income, (La⁄er curve
argument) and the assumption of monopoly power of politician. Our argument incorporates the
e⁄ect of political competition. In our model, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to either
public goods or tax rates is zero, so there is no La⁄er curve, yet limits increase voters￿welfare.
Although imperfect, the electoral competition is what derives our result and make limits work.
As we mention earlier, the market analogy is helpful in thinking about the political corruption.
Using that analogy, constitutional constraints are just tools for regulating a market. What we
have shown that if we have a duopoly with a special demand in that market, a price cap would
increase consumer welfare. Then one wonders, since in our model each ￿rm chooses both its price
and quality, what would be the e⁄ect of a minimum quality regulation on voters￿welfare? That is
to ask, how voters￿welfare would change if we have a constitutional constraint that requires each
candidate to provide at least a minimum level of public good, G? As in tax limits, let us ￿rst note
that the ￿rst best can not be implemented using a minimum public good level constraint. For a
second-best, note that in symmetric equilibrium we have
￿g(S(G) + w + E)E[YiI0(1 ￿
1
a




The e⁄ect of public good constraints on stealing is given by
20S0(G) =
RE[Y 2
i I00(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿RE[Y 2
i I00(1 ￿ ￿)] + LE[YiI0(1 ￿ ￿)]
for S > 0:
where R = L
2gE[YiI0(1￿￿)] Now, whenever the marginal utility from consumption is decreasing, the
derivative, S0(G); is negative, hence to reduce stealing we need higher levels of public goods, i.e.,
another solution to political corruption may be a constitution that enforces a large government!
When we calculate the total e⁄ect of public good limits on voters￿welfare, we ￿nd that
@E[W]
@G







Note that, whenever I(:) is a strictly concave function,
@E[W]
@G is larger than zero at unregulated
political equilibrium, (￿￿;G￿). So, a constitution that enforces any candidate to propose a public
good level that is larger than he would propose without any such constraint would increase the
voters￿welfare. Or more formally,
Proposition 3 Whenever marginal utility from private good is decreasing, (I(c) is strictly con-
cave), and both candidates are identical and corrupt, there always exists a constitutional constraint
that enforces both candidates to o⁄er a public good level that is higher than G￿ and that constraint
is both corruption reducing and welfare-improving.
The intuition for why lower bounds for public good levels work is similar to the intuition for
tax limits. The public good limit increases the taxes, reducing after tax income, and increasing the
marginal utility of private good consumption for a voter, I0(:): That, in return increases a voter￿ s
disutility from corruption, and makes it more costly for a candidate.
We ￿nd that when candidates are identical voters may regulate the political market through
a price cap or a minimum quality requirement. Which type of regulation is better for voters? In
general using both constraints would be much better than using only one. As we discuss below, in
21that case one could implement the ￿rst￿ best. More importantly there are two issues that one has
to consider when discussing these constitutional constraints. These are (i) redistributive e⁄ects of
these constraints, i.e., the burden each constraint puts on di⁄erent income groups in society, and
(ii) (lack of) access to private information, as in any case of regulation.
Suppose that we can achieve the same welfare level whether we use the tax limits or the minimum
public good levels, but want to use only one of them. Furthermore suppose that the most preferred
tax rate of a voter decreases with his income. Then, despite the fact that overall welfare is the
same under both reforms, tax limits will be strictly preferred by rich and public good limits will be
strictly preferred by poor. To see that, note without any limits low (high) income voters actually
would prefer higher (lower) taxes and higher (lower) public good levels given the level of corruption
in the status quo. If they can move towards lower corruption in one of these two ways; (i) higher
￿ and G; and, (ii) lower ￿ and G, low income voters will choose (i), where high income voters
choose (ii). Because of the distributional e⁄ects of these two reforms the identity of designers of
the constitution matters. To see that note that, when the rich (poor) design the constitution, they
have the incentives to choose the tax rate constraints (minimum public good level constraints) even
when such constraints are welfare￿ reducing. That makes our problem di⁄erent from other kinds
of principal￿ agent problems, because there is a con￿ ict of interest among principals, which in turn
makes an agreement by a quali￿ed majority di¢ cult if not impossible. The fact that elections do
not give enough incentives to agents to maximize aggregate welfare does not necessarily mean if
some members of society write a constitution it will always be a welfare improvement.
If the drafters of the constitution have a self interest to pursue as candidates do, then why not to
allow everyone to participate in writing the constitution, ￿ in which case an agreement that would
maximize the median voter￿ s welfare would emerge? One practical reason is the informational
requirements, i.e., drafters should have information on issues such as how easy to steal and how
22able the future politicians are. Such information may not be held by every voter. In our model,
if we know the parameters, we can calculate the cost and bene￿t of constraints and the optimal
constraint, as well as the necessary information to set the optimal constraints.12 Consider the
necessary information required to set the optimal tax rate constraint. Suppose that the writers of
the constitution know both U (to know preferences is not enough, one needs to know the utility
function) and that all future candidates are going to be identical and corrupt. Are they able to set
the correct constraints with this information? The answer is no. The optimal tax rate constraints
in a democratic society depends on the ethics and ability levels of all future candidates as well. A
quote from Hume in Brennan and Buchanan (1980) ￿ ￿in contriving any system of government, and
￿xing the several checks and controls of constitution, every man ought to be suppose a knave, and
to have no other end, in his all actions, than private interest￿￿makes us think that the optimal
rules should be designed under the assumption that all politicians are totally corrupt, not because
they will be, but if we are protected from the worst then we are protected from all.13 This idea
would be correct only when such restrictions are costless. However as Proposition 1 shows, tax
rate constraints are costly in terms of lowering public good level. Whenever candidates are not as
corrupt as the designers of the constitution assume, then tax rates prescribed by drafters will be
set too low. We expect the problem of information to be severe. Otherwise, both for our analysis
and for Brennan and Buchanan￿ s model, when designers have the information about all, current
and future, (identical) politicians, and are maximizing the aggregate voters￿welfare, why to settle
with the second￿ best? In that case, the designers may simply specify both the tax rate and public
good limits at the optimal levels and implement the ￿rst best, (￿o;Go).
12Let us assume that U = c + 2￿
p
G and that designers maximize the expected voters welfare, and candidates are
identical (and corrupt). Then it is easy to show that the tax rate constraint that maximizes voters￿expected welfare




8￿2g2a: (Note that this constraint does not necessarily reduce the corruption to zero.)
13One of the authors, Geo⁄rey Brennan in a recent book, Brennan and Hamlin (2000), notes the problems with
that assumption and notes the importance of ￿economising on virtue￿where he describes his new position as ￿this
marks a sharp departure from earlier writing... where the assumption of self-interested motivation is defended in the
constitutional context.￿
233.2 Constitutional constraints when candidates are not identical
So far we have discussed identical candidates, and have shown that when the designers maximize
expected voters￿welfare rather than the welfare of the income group that they belong to, and have
information, they can design reforms that are welfare increasing. But what if the candidates are
not identical? Then it may be the case that none of the reforms above will work. Let us provide an
example for the tax rate limits, as the case for minimum public good levels is the same. Whenever
two candidates propose di⁄erent tax rates in the equilibrium, the one who proposes the higher tax
rate can be targeted by a constitutional limit on tax rates. This is e⁄ective if the corrupt candidate
selects a higher tax rate. But equilibrium may involve the opposite. For computational simplicity,
let us consider again the quasi￿ linear utility function
U = ci + 2
p
G
with a1 = 0:36; a2 = 0:30; b = 0:08; g = 25; L1 = L2 = 0:8 and assume that there are no
legal rents,14 w = E = 0. In the equilibrium the ￿rst candidate proposes a tax rate of 36% and
the second candidate proposes 32 percent taxes. The public good levels that they propose are
G1 = (0:36)2; and G2 = (0:30)2. Only the second candidate steals. First let us note that any
tax rate constraint higher than 32 percent, that is not binding for the candidate who steals in the
equilibrium, makes voters (and honest candidate) worse o⁄. It will induce candidate 1 to propose
a platform that provides less utility to voters which increases Candidate 2￿ s incentives to steal even
further. A tax rate constraint that is less than 32 percent does not work either. For, when the
tax rate constraint is equal to 32 percent, Candidate 2 is stealing more than what he stole when
there was no constraint. Candidate 2 will reduce the amount he steals back to 2 percent, what he
14To assume that the legal rents are small would do it as well, here we follow Brennan and Buchanan (1980) by
assuming no legal rents.
24stole without the constraint, when the tax rate constraint is about 15 percent,15 ￿ = 0:15: Since
Candidate 1, who, in the ￿rst-best, should produce public good with 36 percent of total income,
is forced to use only 15 percent of total income, the welfare loss due to that is much more than
the welfare loss due to Candidate 2￿ s 2 percent theft. Intuitively, candidate 2 steals because of his
popularity advantage. The other candidate is more able and thus attempts to deliver higher public
good, ￿nanced by higher taxes. Imposing tax rate constraints that bind for the honest candidate,
makes popularity advantage even more important, allowing the corrupt candidate to steal even
more.
Accordingly when candidates are not identical, tax rate constraints works for sure only when
the candidate who proposes larger tax rates is corrupt. Similarly the minimum public good level
requirements will work for sure when the candidate who proposes a smaller government is corrupt.
But, even when both candidates are corrupt, but not identical, and the reform is welfare increasing,
each of the constraints will give a relative advantage to one of the candidates.
4 Legal Incentives
When Sj stands for stealing, as it does in most parts of this paper, one anticipates the possibility
of legal punishment. Let us assume that a corrupt candidate believes that with a small probability,
p, he will get caught and even punished.16 When the leader is caught in corruption, he will be
deprived of his position and hence will lose the legal rents, both w and E: Let us further assume
that there is a legal penalty as well. Although the details of the penalty depend on the laws of




￿￿0:02 + 0:5 + 25[0:08 + 2(
p
0:3(￿ ￿ 0:02) ￿
p
(0:36)￿)] = 0 is ￿ = 0:15203:
16Note that we assume that the probability is independent of the amount the leader steals. It is possible to imagine
situations where stealing a great deal will increase (because of more attention) or decrease (because the politician
becomes very strong and can threaten or bribe) the probability of punishment. We think that, one can ￿nd a
functional form where p = p(Sj) is an increasing/decreasing function, without changing our results qualitatively.
25the country, in general it involves some monetary penalty and imprisonment.17 The legal penalty
for corruption, we assume, is linear in the amount at rate stolen. There is also a ￿xed component
of the penalty with monetary equivalent of C: Thus, the expected rents that candidate j receives
when he is the leader is
R
p
j(Sj) = w + E + 1fSj>0g[LjSj ￿ p(vSj + C + w + E)]: (9)
It is clear that with a su¢ ciently strong legal enforcement, the problem of corruption can be
eradicated. For example whenever pv > 1; the expected gain from corruption is de￿nitely negative
since in that case, Lj ￿ pv < 0 for any Lj: Thus when the legal incentives are high enough, no one
will steal no matter what the electoral incentives are.
We assume that such strong legal incentives are not feasible due to administrative and legal
constraints.18
4.1 Equilibrium Under Law Enforcement
Now the analysis of equilibria is more complicated owing to a discontinuity in the objective function
at Sj = 0: Theorem 1 no longer applies since it made use of the continuity of reaction functions.
In the appendix, we show, however, that the reaction function under law enforcement, s
p
j(Sk); can
have at most one point of discontinuity. Accordingly, the reaction function has the form
17For instance, in the U.S., a public o¢ cial who has accepted a bribe shall be ￿￿ned not more than three times the
monetary equivalent of the thing of value or imprisoned for not more than ￿fteen years or both.￿(18 U.S.C. § 201,
quoted in Rose-Ackermann (1999))
18Increasing p is not easy, since auditing (or prosecuting) the leader is di⁄erent than, say, a tax collector. Since
auditing even tax collectors is not an easy task, we assume that for the leader there is quite inadequate auditing, i.e.,
p is not zero, but is small. Given the weak auditing, what can be done? One solution, known as Becker conundrum,
is to have a low probability of detection, but a very high punishment when the o⁄ender is caught. It makes law
enforcement e⁄ective, despite the low probability of detection. That quick ￿x we think is not feasible either. In many
countries, the legal system itself is not very accurate and is subject to in￿ uence by the executive branch. To allow one
politician to be severely punished may deter not only corruption but also opposition. So we assume that the system














j(Sk) is the continuous and upward sloping reaction function that one would calculate
had the value of the objective function be equal to its limit from the right and thus continuos at









The point of discontinuity, e Sk; increases in the parameters of law enforcement, p;v:C.20 Ow-
ing to this discontinuity there can be multiple (two) equilibria. In one of these equilibria, both
candidates stay clean, and in the other one at least one of them steals.21 The conditions for the
existence of multiple equilibria for a general utility function are quite messy.22 The question that
we are interested in is when there is an equilibrium with at least one candidate stealing despite the
legal incentives how e⁄ective are the higher wages in deterring political corruption?
Unlike constitutional constraints, the legal incentives are important here in evaluating the e⁄ect
of higher wages and the e⁄ect of higher penalties on corruption and social welfare. In the following
sections we explain why this is so.
4.2 Wage reform
As Persson and Tabellini (2000) observed higher ego rents imply lower political corruption.23 Al-
though politicians who get higher ego rents from being leaders are good for the voters, it is not
clear how to ￿nd such people and replace the current (and corrupt) political elite with them. After
Becker and Stigler (1974), e¢ ciency wages are proposed by many authors in the literature as a
19For more on that see appendix.
20Simply applying implicit function theorem gives this result.
21The second equilibria Pareto dominates the ￿rst one, from each candidate￿ s point of view. For more on this, see
section 4.4.
22The necessary and su¢ cient condition for existence of an equilibrium where both candidates steal is e Sk < S
p
k(e Sj)
for at least one j 2 f1;2g and k 2 f1;2gnfjg:
23See Theorem 4.
27solution to bureaucratic corruption.
Similar to ego rents, higher wages also makes winning the election more attractive, and induce
the agents to comply more with voter will. The advantage of increasing wages over increasing ego
rents is that it is easier to increase the monetary compensation than rents based on psychological
factors. On the other hand, wage increases unlike increases in ego rents, should be ￿nanced from
the public budget. Since, a clean government may have a high cost in terms of high wages paid to
the political agents, one should calculate not only the e⁄ect of wages on corruption, but also the
net e⁄ect, including the e⁄ect of wages on taxes and on public good levels. The total e⁄ect of an













That implies, if we increase the wage candidate j receives, this will increase voter welfare only when
the bene￿t of high wages (a decrease in Sj and hence an increase in Gj) is larger than the cost
of high wages (a decrease in public good due to higher wages), i.e., only when
dSj(w)
dw < ￿1. Also
note that the net bene￿t from one candidate a⁄ects voters￿welfare proportional to the likelihood
of that candidate winning the election. One implication of (10) is that whenever both candidates
are honest, increasing wages is always bad for voter welfare, since it does not improve the quality of
service, but instead, increases the cost of it.25 So when one of the candidates is honest, increasing
wages is not as e⁄ective as when both are stealing. Even when Sj > 0 for both candidates, the
wage increase is good for voter welfare only when a dollar increase in wages reduces stealing more
than a dollar: The next proposition characterizes exactly when that happens.
Proposition 4 (i)When both candidates are identical, a small increase in wages increases voter
24See Appendix for the derivation.
25Here we disregard the possibility that higher wages will attract higher ability candidates to politics, see Morelli
and Caselli (2001) for a model of endogenously determined candidate characteristics.
28welfare if and only if
L ￿ pv < 1 ￿ p.
(ii) If the candidates are not identical, yet both steal in the equilibrium, then for a small increase
in wages to be welfare-increasing, a necessary condition is minfL1;L2g￿pv < 1￿p, while a su¢ cient
condition is maxfL1;L2g ￿ pv < 1 ￿ p:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The wage increases work in two channels. The ￿direct￿e⁄ect is that higher wages increase the
rents from the o¢ ce and hence the weight the candidate puts on voter welfare goes up, inducing
lower corruption. The ￿strategic￿e⁄ect, on the other hand, works on the last part of (8): a rival
candidate also reduces his corruption, ￿j is now lower, which further reduces the incentives to steal.
Obviously the strategic e⁄ect occurs only when the rival candidate is also corrupt. An honest
candidate cannot lower his level of corruption. Hence, the prize (higher wages) are most e¢ cient
inducing higher compliance with voter will when both candidates are identical and corrupt, i.e.,
a1 = a2 and b = 0.26
Similar to the optimal constitutional constraints, we have redistributive and informational issues
with the salary reform: Suppose, again, that the most preferred tax rate decreases with income,
and there are several reforms providing the same level of aggregate voters￿welfare. When salary
reform is chosen, taxes go up, but also the public good level. Everyone pays the cost (higher
taxes), but the rich pay proportionally higher fraction. While the bene￿t (higher public good
level), is also distributed equally. So for the same e⁄ect on (aggregate) voter welfare, high income
voters would prefer the tax limits and low income voters would prefer either the wage increases or
minimum public good requirements. Similarly, the optimal wage for candidate j, a wage that would
maximize the expected welfare of the voters, can be calculated, but one needs to know about the
26In Appendix, we calculate the e⁄ect of wages when one of the candidates is honest.
29honesty, e¢ ciency and popularity of the candidate and his rival.
4.3 Small Changes in Penalties
There is always pressure on politicians from the public and nowadays from multinational organiza-
tions for harsher penalties on corruption. Although we have not speci￿ed the cost of higher legal
incentives,27 we feel that we may still speculate on the question that if in reaction to these pres-
sures some small steps are taken, how would the outcome be changed?28 The following proposition
considers the e⁄ects of a small increase in either constant or variable components of corruption
penalties.
Proposition 5 A small increase in
(i) constant penalty, C; leads to an increase in political corruption,
(ii) variable penalty, v; reduces corruption only when the expected constant penalty is less than
the expected legal rents for a corrupt candidate, pC < (1 ￿ p)(w + E):
Proof. By applying the implicit function theorem on (8)=0.
The intuition for (i) is that an increase in C actually reduces the expected rents from o¢ ce and
hence reduces the weight politician puts on voter welfare. Then, the marginal utility of stealing is
higher for candidate j; so Sj is higher in the equilibrium. We have the same e⁄ect for the variable
penalty as well, i.e., lower rents from the o¢ ce as a result of higher penalties. But for the latter,
there is another e⁄ect that works in the opposite direction, the higher the v; the lower is Lj ￿ pv,
i.e., the expected penalty per dollar stolen increases. As the previous ones, that result too depends
on the change in the relative weights discussed in (8). If the decrease in the weight on voter welfare
27That we beleive requires explicitly modelling the relationship between law enforcers and the political leaders,
a relationship that di⁄ers from the typical principal agent interaction. Here each side is principal and an agent in
di⁄erent instances.
28We have already seen that if the incentives are "strong enough" there will be no corruption.
30due to the ￿rst e⁄ect is lower than the decrease in expected monetary bene￿t of a dollar stolen,
then the second e⁄ect dominates and the equilibrium level of Sj will be lower.
The constant penalty is good only if it is high enough to completely deter corruption. Note
that the condition for the e⁄ectiveness of a variable penalty will be more di¢ cult to hold when the
constant penalty is higher. Thus, in our model, the constant penalty can be justi￿ed only when it
is su¢ ciently high to completely deter the political corruption.
4.4 Political Support for Anti-corruption Reform
We have seen that under some conditions some reforms, such as a su¢ ciently large improvement
in legal incentives, will stop corruption. But such a reform needs to be proposed and implemented.
An interesting question, then, is whether politicians will support the reform. A utility-maximizing
politician should compare the bene￿ts and costs of the reform for himself. Adding the reform to
policy platform would increase his vote shares in current elections, yet curbing corruption might
reduce his current and future payo⁄s. Since the problem is a dynamic one and our model is static,
we discuss this question only informally here.29
Successful anti-corruption reforms, will be welcomed by the electorate. Yet, we have corruption
to begin with exactly because there is an agency problem: policies that the electorate appreciates
are not necessarily being implemented. If all candidates agree not to propose the reform, it will
never be implemented and the corruption among the political leaders will continue.30 When both
candidates are corrupt it is not di¢ cult to see that if the illegal rents from corrupt status quo are
signi￿cantly high, then each of the (corrupt) candidates would rationally choose not to propose the
reform.
One may be inclined to think that this corruption trap is possible only when all the politicians are
29We discuss this issue in a simpler setting with three candidates in Evrenk(2004).
30Of course, the reform can be proposed and be implemented by people other than politicians, as was the case in
Italy with clean hands. But, eventually without the support of political leaders such reforms may not be long lasting.
31corrupt. Since an honest politician receives no bene￿t from the corrupt status quo, he will incur no
cost by supporting the reform. This reasoning is, however, not always correct. Consider an honest
leader, Candidate 1, who is going to compete with a corrupt rival in the next election. An anti-
corruption reform that will prevent all future corruption will a⁄ect the policy platform of Candidate
2 in future elections. It will induce Candidate 2 to o⁄er a more voter friendly platform. This will
reduce the honest candidate￿ s vote share. So, the honest candidate may also not propose the reform.
The intuition for this is that political competition is a zero sum game without corruption, but this
is not true with corruption. The existence of corruption bene￿ts both candidates, even when one
of the candidates is completely honest. When one candidate is corrupt, he is better o⁄, since he
can get the illegal rents. The (honest) competitor is better o⁄ because by stealing the candidate
makes his policy platform less attractive and hence the policy platform of his rival becomes more
attractive. When the choice to be corrupt is no longer available, the corrupt candidate is going to
lose his rents, but the honest one will lose some of his voters.
5 Other Approaches to Agency Problem in Politics.
Adsera, Boix and Payne (2003) extend the incumbency model by Persson and Tabellini (2000).
They examine the incentives of incumbents to steal, given that voters have incomplete information
about the state of the world and support the incumbent whenever he achieves a minimal perfor-
mance standard. In their model, the minimum performance standard is the expected utility from
the challenger and is exogenous. As can be seen in section 4.2, the strategic e⁄ects, the change in
the challenger￿ s performance as a result of, say a change in wages, is absent when the performance
of challenger is ￿xed. Caselli and Morelli (2004) studied what determines the honesty and quality
of elected politicians. Unlike us, they allow the quality to be determined endogenously. But in their
model corrupt politicians do extract as much rents as they possibly can, i.e., there is no concern for
32reelection. The di⁄erence is mainly due to the fact that we study competition among ￿nitely many,
two, politicians whereas they study a continuum of politicians. In their model the large number
of players reduces the strategic incentives in rent extraction to zero. So, politicians either steal
everything or they do not steal at all. Our analysis di⁄ers from both of these studies by modeling
the strategic interaction between candidates.
Our model is a static one, politicians compete only once. That framework, in general would give
rise to commitment problems, i.e., when the campaign promises are non-enforceable, non-veri￿able,
or non-observable, the agent has incentives to deviate from the promised behavior. In our analysis,
we assume away that problem. The corrupt politicians in our model are honest thieves: they will
deliver what they promised, although if political competition happens once a corrupt politician
who won the election has incentives to steal all public revenue, not a fraction of it. What we want
to show is that even when there is no agency problem in terms of commitment, corruption still
occurs. Obviously if a candidate steals even when the campaign promises are enforceable, he will
do so when they are not. It is possible to get rid of problem of commitment by assuming future
elections and candidates with high discount rates as described in detail by Persson and Tabellini
(2000, Ch. 4). Then the fear of losing the future gains induces at least some commitment by the
candidates.
6 Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, we discussed possible reasons for the persistence of corruption in democracies. We
analyzed some commonly proposed reforms and show when, how and why they may (not) be useful.
We pointed out serious informational problems and the con￿ ict of interest among voters when one
wants to regulate the political competition. We also argued that politicians themselves, honest
and corrupt, may oppose anti-corruption reforms. For the analysis, we use a static probabilistic
33voting model with heterogenous candidates. We are planning to extend our analysis in following
directions: (i) campaign ￿nancing, (ii) candidates with ideological motivations, and (iii) Principal-
Agent analysis when agent has some authority over the principle.
In our model, the candidates steal for their own consumption which reduces their vote shares.
We also observe that when campaign ￿nancing matters, candidates steal (or have alliances with
businesspeople who will steal when candidates win the elections) to be able to raise money for
campaign ￿nancing. To look at the corruption as the source of campaign ￿nancing, one would
require a di⁄erent model with voters who have imperfect information.
A candidate can have strong preferences on policy on the one hand and use his opportunities to
steal on the other. The interaction of a candidate￿ s policy preferences (on the tax rate and public
good) and the amount he steals, as well as which part of the policy platform he steals from, could
shed some light on the relationship between economic development and corruption.
The design and implementation of legal incentives for politicians are not simple applications of
Principal￿ Agent theory. The Agent (candidate) has powers on the word of the contract as well as its
enforcement that is unimaginable in standard Principal￿ Agent models. We believe that the analysis
of the optimal contract as well as that of optimal auditing structure (in terms of institutions) in
that framework is worth attention.
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i ;Gk)] + Pj]; where Pj = 2(j ￿ 3
2)b:
Proof. Without knowing the personal preferences of each voter, a candidate can not know whether
a speci￿c voter is going to vote for him or not. What he can know is that voter i will vote for the
34candidate 1 i⁄ U1
i > U2
i which is equivalent to say,
bi2 < U(c1
i;G1) ￿ U(c2
i;G2) ￿ b ￿ b2:




i;G2) ￿ b ￿ b2]: If we sum this over Yi the expected vote share of the




i;G2)] ￿ b ￿ b2]:






Using the distribution of b2, we ￿nd that the probability of candidate 1 winning the elections





Lemma 3 The voters￿expected (utilitarian) welfare, E[W]; as a function of policy platforms and
popularity of each candidate can be written as E[Ui((1 ￿ ￿2)Yi;G2(￿2;S2))] + b + 1
2g(￿1)2:
Proof. The voter i0s expected welfare is equal to
￿E[U1
i jcandidate 1 won the election] + (1￿￿)E[U2
i jcandidate 2 won the election]. The expected
value of bi2 conditional on candidate 2 winning the election is equal to its unconditional expected
value, which is zero. So the voter i￿ s expected welfare is equal to
￿1Ui((1 ￿ ￿1)Yi;G1) + (1 ￿ ￿)Ui((1 ￿ ￿2)Yi;G2) + (1 ￿ ￿1)b
+(1 ￿ ￿)Eb2[b2 j b2 < E[U(c1
i;G1) ￿ U(c2
i;G2)] ￿ b]:
Note that (1 ￿ ￿)Eb2[b2 j b2 < E[U(c1
i;G1) ￿ U(c2
i;G2)] ￿ b]






1￿￿ ; which is equal to
351
2g[1
4 ￿ (￿1 ￿ 1
2)2]: Thus we can write the welfare of voter i as,










Summing (11) over i and using (4), we have the desired result.
F.O.C. with respect to Tax Rate and the E⁄ect of Corruption on Taxes and Public Good Levels.
To solve (5), candidate j should choose a tax rate such that the marginal utility of tax rate for
candidate j,
gRj
@E[Ui((1 ￿ ￿j)Yi;aj(￿j ￿ W ￿ Sj))]
@￿j
(12)
is zero at ￿￿
j: Since gRj is always positive, the ￿rst order condition w.r.to tax rate holds only when
@E[Ui(￿j;Sj)]
@￿j = 0: Thus, when maximizing his expected payo⁄s, candidate j chooses a tax rate that
maximizes E[Ui(￿j;Sj)]; the average welfare of voters, for given corruption level, Sj: Then, when
the candidate j does not steal, the policy platform he chooses is optimal, ￿￿
j = ￿0
j:
Note that the f.o.c. with respect to tax rate does not directly depend on the policy platform
of candidate k. The e⁄ect of other candidate￿ s platform will be seen, if at all, through Sj. Using






i I00(ci)+(aj)2H00(G)] 2 [0;1]: Figure 2 shows how Sj determines ￿￿
j for three di⁄erent
utility functions, U.
The quasi￿ linear utility functions determine the borders of the derivative: When I(:) is linear,
I00(:) = 0; we have
@￿￿
j(Sj)
@Sj = 1: Then the e⁄ect of political corruption is socially optimal public good
levels, G0




In such case the tax rates are always optimal, candidate steals only from the public good: When









Figure 2: The e⁄ect of stealing on the tax rate
corruption is both lower than optimal public good levels and higher than optimal taxes. The kinks
in the ￿gure that we encounter in two quasi￿ linear cases are due to the ￿nite marginal utility at
zero consumption. In such case, the harm done to voters by stealing the last penny in the public
budget or taking the last penny of the taxpayer is not di⁄erent then stealing a penny from a large
budget. Thus, a candidate may ￿nd it good policy to supply optimal public good yet impose 100
percent taxes. We can rule out those ￿extreme￿platforms, i.e., platforms that when implemented
voters have zero (public or private good) consumption, by assuming that even in the quasi￿ linear
case, the utility becomes strictly concave and the marginal utility goes to in￿nity around an epsilon
neighborhood of zero consumption.31 Hence, the strategy space relevant to our analysis, (￿￿
j(Sj);Sj)






; the Marginal utility of corruption for candidate j, (8), is continuous
and strictly decreasing, -hence the objective function is strictly quasi￿ concave-, in Sj; and continuous










G for G ￿
p
":
For " small enough the distance between H(G) and H
"(G) is minuscule. Yet, as a result of this change, a candidate
never o⁄ers zero public good, since o⁄ering a little bit of public good increases voters￿utility signifcantly. Thus
(￿
￿
j(Sj);Sj) is a smooth curve.
37and strictly increasing in Sk:






in both ￿j and in Sj: Similarly Rj(:) is also continuous in Sj: For the derivative as we increase Sj;




@Gj we have two e⁄ects but since
@￿￿
j(Sj)





@Gj # : The arguments for Sk is similar, only simpler.
Lemma 5 The corruption levels of candidates are strategic complements,
@s0
j(Sk)
@Sk > 0, with in-
equality being strict when s0
j(Sk) > 0.
Proof. When s0
j (Sk) > 0, we have (8) evaluated at (s0
j (Sk);Sk) is equal to zero: Then using





















where zjk = Ljak
@E[U(ck
i ;Gk)]









0 and as we have shown above
@￿￿
j(Sj)
@Sj ￿ 1 ￿ 0: Thus both the nominator and denominator is posi-
tive. When (8) is negative at Sj = 0 then by continuity an in￿nitesimal increase in Sk is not going
to increase the optimal Sj:
Proposition 6 Reaction functions s0
1(S2) and s0
2(S1), if continuous, do not intersect more than
once in the interior, i.e., S￿
1 > 0;S￿




j is unique, if it exists.







@Sj ￿ 1 in at least one of the equilibria.
Using (13), we have






@Sj ￿ 1 ,
zjkzkj
4zjjzkk+Z ￿ 1 where Z ￿ 0:






@Sj ￿ 1 ,
zjjzkk
4zjjzkk+Z ￿ 1 where Z ￿ 0. Contradiction.
Corollary 1 For later use note that the above result can be written as S￿
j > 0 and S￿





















: By Berge￿ s Maximum Theorem the best response correspondence, s0
j (Sk) is upper
hemi-continuous. In Lemma 5, we ￿nd that the objective function is strictly quasi-concave in Sj
implying that s0
j (Sk) is single valued, and hence is continuous. Using this result with Kakutani￿ s
Fixed Point Theorem we have the existence of equilibrium in pure strategies. For uniqueness
let us ￿rst note that by No Extreme Platforms assumption we have 0 6 s0
j (Sk) < 1: If there
exists an interior equilibrium, then Proposition 6 shows that it is the only interior equilibrium.
The continuity of reaction functions with strategic complementarity implies that even a corner







@Sj = 0 (and even when both reaction functions have nonzero












@Sj < 1 holds
for the interior equilibrium as well. Since the reaction functions are continuous there should be







@Sj ￿ 1. Contradiction. The same argument can be used to






@Sj < 1, then we can not have any
other corner equilibrium or interior equilibrium.
Equilibrium Outcome
The condition that candidate j steals even when his rival does not, s0












j) ￿ Pj: (CONDj)
When it holds, s0
j (0) > 0 is the point where the reaction function intersects the Sj axis. On
the other hand when s0
j (0) = 0; then we can de￿ne the point where the reaction function, s0
j (Sk)
intersects Sk axis as Sk = inffSk : s0
j(Sk) > 0g:








ajg[w + E + Ljs0
j(0)]H0(Gj(s0
j(0)): (INEQj)
Then, the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is:
(a) S￿
1 = S￿









j) ￿ Pj; 8 j 2 f1;2g
(b) a unique pair S￿
1 > 0; S￿










j) ￿ Pj; 8 j 2 f1;2g


















j(0) > 0 and S￿



























Analysis of Equilibrium Under Law Enforcement






j(Sj) for Sj > 0;
limSj#0 R
p
j(Sj) at Sj = 0:
The function ￿j(Sj;Sk)rj(Sj) is strictly quasi￿ concave and continuous in Sj and continuous in
Sk. Then we derive a ￿fake￿reaction function for candidate j, Sj(Sk); from the optimization of















j(0) and Sj(Sk) > 0:
0 otherwise.
Now, (8)=0 is necessary but not su¢ cient for s
p
j (Sk) > 0; although it is both necessary and
su¢ cient for Sj(Sk) > 0.
The ￿fake￿reaction function, Sj(Sk); is similar to s0
j (Sk) in the sense that it comes from the
maximization of a continuous and strictly quasi-concave objective function over a convex domain,
hence it is single valued, increasing and continuous in Sk: Also Proposition 6 can be applied to the
intersection of Sj(Sk)￿ s. It is this similarity that we use to extend the results from the analysis with
no law enforcement. The following Lemma shows that when Sj(Sk) becomes relevant at some level
of candidate k￿ s corruption, it is always relevant for any higher level of corruption. Hence, s
p
j (Sk)
can have at most one discontinuity and is strictly increasing in Sk as far as s
p
j (Sk) > 0.
Lemma 6 If s
p
j (S0
k) = Sj (S0
k) for some S0
k with Sj(S0
k) > 0 then
￿j(Sj(Sk);Sk)Rj(Sj(Sk)) > ￿j(0;Sk)Rj(0) for any Sk > S0
k:
Proof. Take any S0








j(0). Let us note that both
41sides are continuously di⁄erentiable in S0
k and consider an in￿nitesimal increase in S0
k. The increase

















0: The increase in r.h.s. is equal to B = ￿dSk
@E[Uk
i ]
@Sk gRj(0) > 0: We need to show that A ￿ B > 0.
Note that Sj(S0





k)) + (Lj ￿ pv)￿j(Sj (S0
k);S0
k) = 0.








k)]. We know that candidate j￿ s prob-












j(0) implies that Rj(Sj(S0
k)) > Rj(0). Hence A￿B > 0:
The di⁄erence is that now the game can have multiple equilibria, one equilibrium where no
candidate steals and another one where at least one does. By an application of Proposition 6, the
interior equilibrium is unique, (the intuition is that in the interior equilibrium it is the Sj(Sk)0s






































































Proof of Proposition 4. Taking the derivative of ￿rst order conditions and noting that the
derivative of
@E[Ui((1￿￿j)Yi;aj(￿j￿W￿Sj))]
@￿j with respect Sj is equal to the derivative with respect to

















































































































(@Sk)2 Aj > 0.
By Lemma 5
@2(￿jRj)
@Sj@Sk > 0 and
@2(￿kRk)
(@Sk)2 < 0: From here it is easy to see that minfAk; Ajg > 0
is necessary and maxfAk; Ajg > 0 is su¢ cient for higher wages to be welfare increasing when
43candidates steal.
Lemma 8 If only candidate j steals in the equilibrium, we have
dSj
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